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Bery v. New York: DO ARTISTS HAVE A FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO SELL AND DISPLAY ART IN
PUBLIC PLACES?
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1993, artists have been fighting a war on the streets of
New York City.' The artists oppose the General Vendors Law,
2
which prohibits general vendors from selling their goods in public
places without a license.3 Under the law, artists face a dilemma:
they can be arrested if they sell their art without a license, but
licenses are virtually impossible to obtain.4 As a result, many artists
choose to sell their work without permits, facing the possibility of
arrest.
5
In Bery v. New York, 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit addressed the issue of whether a regulation that
prohibits selling art in public places without a license violates the
First Amendment rights of artists7 The court held that the General
Vendors Law, as applied to artists, was unconstitutional under the
First Amendment. 8
This Note will examine the court's decision in Bery to deter-
mine its place in relevant First Amendment precedent. Section II
1. See Bruce Lambert, Fighting for the Freedom to Sell Art on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1993, S13 at 6. As one commentator noted, art is the battleground for
America's most intensely political and deeply personal wars. Daniel Mach, Note,
The Bold and the Beautiful: Art, Public Spaces, and the First Amendment, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383 (1997).
2. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, § 20-453.
3. See id. There are certain exceptions to the law. See New York City, N.Y.
Local Law 33 (1982) amending NEW YORK CrIy, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, § 20-453. No
license is required to sell written materials, such as newspapers and magazines. See
id. In addition, all veterans who qualify receive a license. See id.
4. See Nicole Gaouette, Conflict on the Streets: Artists v. N.Y C., CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR, Feb. 14, 1996, Arts at 11. For a discussion of the difficulty artists
faced in obtaining licences, see infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the consequences artists suffer as a result of these ar-
rests, see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
6. 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2408 (1997).
7. See id. at 694-98. For a discussion of the facts of Bery, see infra notes 14-33
and accompanying text.
8. See id. at 698. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
(103)
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summarizes the facts of Bery.9 Section III provides background and
examines prior court decisions.10 Section IV examines the Bery
court's decision and its reasoning.'" Section V discusses whether
the Bery court's decision was in line with prior First Amendment
decisions.' 2 Finally, Section VI discusses the impact of the Bery deci-
sion on First Amendment jurisprudence and the extent of a city's
ability to regulate the sale of art on the streets.1 3
II. FACTS
Pursuant to the General Vendors Law,14 no individual can ex-
hibit, sell, or offer goods for sale in public places in New York City
unless the individual first obtains a general vendors license.15 Un-
9. For a discussion of the facts of Bery, see infra notes 14-33 and accompanying
text.
10. For a discussion of relevant First Amendment law, see infra notes 34-102
and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the Bey court's reasoning and analysis, see infra notes
103-32 and accompanying text.
12. For a critical discussion of the court's decision in Bery, see infra notes 133-
57 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the potential impact that the Bery decision may have on
First Amendment jurisprudence and the regulation of art sales on city streets, see
infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
14. NEW YORK Crrv, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-453 et seq.
15. See id. The relevant language of the statute provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any individual to act as a general vendor without
having first obtained a license in accordance with the provisions of this
subchapter, except that it shall be lawful for a general vendor who hawks,
peddles, sells or offers to sell, at retail, only newspapers, periodicals,
books, pamphlets or other similar written matter, but no other items re-
quired to be licensed by any other provision of this code, to vend such
without obtaining a license therefor.
Bery v. New York, 906 F. Supp. 163, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing NEW YORK CITY,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-453). The ordinance defines a general vendor as any per-
son who "hawks, peddles, sells, leases or offers to sell or lease, at retail, [non-food]
goods or services . . . in a public space." Bery v. New York, 97 F.3d 684, 692 (2d
Cir. 1996) (citing NEw YoRK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-452(b)), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct. 2408 (1997). Public space is defined as:
[a]ll publicly owned property between the property lines on a street as
such property lines are shown on the City Record including . . . a park,
plaza, roadway, shoulder, tree space, sidewalk or parking space between
such property lines . . . [as well as] publicly owned or leased land, build-
ings, piers, wharfs, stadiums and terminals.
Id. (citing Administrative Code § 20-452(d)). An important purpose of the law was
to prevent congestion. See generally A1-Amin v. New York, 979 F. Supp. 168
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
Violation of the General Vendors Law was a misdemeanor punishable by fine,
imprisonment, or civil penalties. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 692 (citing NEW YORK cmTY,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-452(b)). If a violator was criminally convicted, he or she
was subject to a fine of not less than $250 nor more than $1000 and/or imprison-
ment of up to three months. See id. (citing NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 20-472(a)). If a violator was held civilly liable, he or she was subject to the same
[Vol. 5: p. 103
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fortunately for artists, compliance with the law was difficult because
the total number of licenses throughout the city was limited to
853.16 The law, however, did not apply equally to everyone. For
example, despite this licensing cap, veterans could always obtain a
license, regardless of how many licenses the city had issued. 17 Addi-
tionally, the sale of written matter was exempted from the license
requirement.18
Obtaining a license was difficult, if not impossible, for artists
who were required to comply with the law. 19 As a result, many art-
fine, together with a fine of $250 for each day of the unlicensed activity. See id.
(citing NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-472(c)(1)). Additionally, police
officers were authorized to seize the items being sold, and the items were subject
to forfeiture. See id. (citing NEW YORK CIY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-468 and 20-
472(a)).
Even if a vendor obtains a license, the General Vendors Law restricts the ven-
dor's ability to sell and display his or her goods. See id. For example, Administra-
tive Code §§ 20-465(a), (b), (e), (f), (k), (in), (n) and (q) restrict the placement,
location and size of vending displays and prohibit vending where an authorized
city employee has notified the vendor that there are exigent circumstances which
require the vendor to move. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 692. Additionally, vending of all
goods except for written matter is not permitted in a park unless the vendor has
obtained written authorization from the Department of Parks and Recreation. See
id. (citing NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-465(j)). Vending is also
banned from certain zoning districts and a specific section of downtown Manhat-
tan. See id. (citing NEW YoRK Crrv, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-465(g)).
16. SeeBeryv. New York, 906 F. Supp. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In 1979, the
General Vendors Law was amended to limit the total number of licenses in effect
at any given time to 853. See id. Consequently, licenses became virtually impossi-
ble to obtain. See Anne Robertson, City Eyes Issues of Street Artists, NEWSDAY, Nov. 30,
1993 at 33. New York conceded at oral argument that the waiting list for a license
was between 500 to 5000 persons. Bery, 97 F.3d at 699.
17. See Bery, 906 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing N.Y. Gen. Bus. L.
§ 32(1)). The legislative history indicates the right to sell goods is very important
for disabled veterans who have not been able to find any means of support. See
New York Legis. Annual 1991 at 387-89. According to the legislature, these veter-
ans were injured in the service of the United States, and therefore they deserve
assistance wherever possible. See id. As a result, under the New York State General
Business Law, any veteran who qualifies for a vending license must be issued one.
See Bery v. New York, 906 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Therefore, at the time of
the Bery decision, 1,193 licenses were in effect. See id.
18. See id. Initially, Section 20-453 of the General Vendors Law required all
general vendors to have a license. See id. However, in 1982, the law was amended
to exempt vendors or newspapers, books, or other written matter. See id. The City
Council described the amendment as "consonant with the 'principles of free
speech and freedom of the press.'" Bery, 97 F.3d at 692.
19. See Robertson, supra note 16 at 33 See also supra note 16 and accompany-
ing text.
19981
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ists sold their art in the streets without licenses. 20 Often, police ar-
rested the artists and seized their artwork. 21
The plaintiffs2 2 in Beyy v. New York sought a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent New York City from enforcing the General Vendors
Law against them.23 They argued that the ordinance violated their
First Amendment right to freedom of expression 24 and their rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
20. See Robertson, supra note 16 at 33. Many artists struggled to get licenses,
but failed. For example, Julio Romano, an artist, stated, "[w]ay before I was a
street artist, I tried everything to get a permit but got turned down." Id. See also
Adine Y. Kernberg, Note, The Right to Bear Art: The Impact of Municipal Anti-Peddling
Ordinances on the First Amendment Rights of Artists, 18 COLuM-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 155
(1993). Kernberg noted that in 1993 the waiting list for a license had been closed
for six years. See id. at 190 n.9 (citing Telephone Interview with Sherry Speaker,
Community Assistant at New York City Department of Consumer Affairs (Dec. 2,
1993)).
21. See Lambert, supra note 1 at 6. Between July of 1993 and July of 1994,
police in Manhattan made over 100 arrests of artists for peddling their original
paintings, sculptures and woodcarvings on city streets without permits. See Sam
Walker, New York Reins in Street Art, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 14, 1994, Arts
at 11. The arrests of artists caused a lot of controversy, particularly in communi-
ties like Soho. See id. There, the presence of the street artists causes congestion
and crowding. See id. However, many business owners support the artists. See id.
For example, Robert Ellis Patterson, a consultant with Martin Lawrence Galleries,
stated "Soho is known as an art center .... The street artists add color, and their
art is legitimate. Many of the artists in this gallery got their start on the streets ....
Id.
22. The plaintiffs in Bey were visual artists who sold their artwork on public
sidewalks and an artists' advocacy organization called Artists for Creative Expres-
sion on the Sidewalks of New York City. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 691. Most of the
plaintiffs had been arrested, or threatened with arrest, had received summonses,
been fined, or have had their works confiscated when they sold art on the street
without a license. See Bey, 906 F. Supp. at 166. One plaintiff desired to sell her art
on the sidewalks, but had not done so out of fear of arrest and destruction of her
work. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 691-92.
23. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 691-92. The plaintiffs, including Robert Bery, had
been arrested, threatened with arrest, or harassed by law enforcement officials for
attempting to display and sell their creations in public spaces in the City without a
general vendors license. See id. Some of the plaintiffs had their artwork confis-
cated and damaged. See id. One artist stated, "Police confiscation of our materials
must stop, since we are not insured on the streets .... If our stuff is defaced or
stolen, we have no backups." Anne Robertson, supra note 16 at 33. At least one
plaintiff in Bery asserted that she desired to sell her artwork on New York City
sidewalks, but was afraid to do so because of the possibility that she could be ar-
rested or her work could be destroyed. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 691-92.
24. See Bey, 906 F. Supp. at 165. The plaintiffs did not argue that their paint-
ings were political, nor did they allege that the city was motivated by any animus
against artists. See id. Rather, they argued that the First Amendment's protection
of free speech extends to all works of fine art. See id.
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ment.2 5 The district court denied the motion,26 holding that
although art is protected by the First Amendment in certain cir-
cumstances, the City does not necessarily violate the First Amend-
ment by regulating the sale of art in public areas. 27 The district
court found that the plaintiffs did not show that the ordinance un-
constitutionally interfered with the plaintiffs' freedom of speech
under the First Amendment. 28 Additionally, the District Court held
that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of
25. See id. at 166. The plaintiffs' equal protection argument was based on
the fact that the ordinance exempted sellers of "newspapers, periodicals, books,
pamphlets, or other similar written matter" from the licensing requirement. Id.
26. See id. at 163.
27. See id. at 167. The district court stated that:
The text of the First Amendment explicitly refers to "speech" and "the
press." The precise nature of First Amendment protection for painting
and sculpture with no verbal elements has not been addressed by the
federal courts. Although several opinions include generalized statements
concerning the protection of artistic works by the First Amendment...
those cases did not present the issues raised here.
Id. The court stated that while there is some expressive content in fine art, it is not
the type of expression which is meant to receive First Amendment protection. See
id. Rather, First Amendment protection is meant to prevent government censor-
ship. See id. In its analysis, the court distinguished the New York City Criminal
Court's holding in People v. Bery. See id. (distinguishing People v. Bery, N.Y.L.J.,
May 20, 1994). The court's distinction was based on the fact that in the criminal
case, the defendant's work expressed a clear political viewpoint, and in some cases
involved the written word. See id. at 167. Additionally, the court relied on People v.
Milby, 140 Misc. 2d 476 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1988) and San Francisco Street Artists
Guild v. Scott, 37 Cal. App. 3d 667 (App. Ct. 1974). For a discussion of the facts and
holding of Milbry, see supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the court's holding in San Francisco Street Artist's Guild, see supra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text. The plaintiff attempted to distinguish these cases, arguing
that there was no evidence in these cases to show the plaintiffs were unable to
obtain a license. See Bery, 906 F. Supp. at 167. However, the district court did not
embrace this argument. See id. Rather, the court relied on the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral regulations. See id. at 168. For a discussion of
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations, see supra
notes 67-76.
28. See id. at 170. Applying the test articulated by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien, the court found that the regulation of activities in public
areas was clearly within the City's constitutional power, the City's interest in keep-
ing the streets free of congestion furthered an important or substantial interest
which was unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the regulation fur-
thered that interest. See id. at 168. O'Brien lays out a four-part test which states that
a content-neutral government regulation is constitutional if 1) it is within the con-
stitutional power of the government; 2) it furthers an important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest; 3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and 4) the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest. See United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 367-77 (1968). For a discussion of the holding of O'Brien,
see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
1998]
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the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 Therefore, the district court denied
the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.A0
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the district court's decision Aa The Second Circuit
held that the ordinance violated both the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 2 There-
fore, the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the district court
and granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction.33
III. BACKGROUND
A. First Amendment Protection of Art
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech.134 It is well settled that the
First Amendment protects various forms of expression in addition
to oral speech.3 5 Clearly, however, the protection provided to these
forms of expression by the First Amendment is not unlimited.36
29. See Bery, 906 F. Supp. 170. The court found that "art is farther from the
core [of the First Amendment] than the written word." Id.
30. See id.
31. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 689.
32. See id. at 694-96, 699. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in
Bevy, see infra notes 103-32 and accompanying text.
33. See Bevy, 97 F.3d at 699.
34. U.S. CONST., amend. I. Municipal ordinances are within the scope of this
limitation on governmental authority. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938) (noting it is well settled that municipal ordinances adopted under state
authority are within reach of First Amendment).
35. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (stating music
is protected form of expression under First Amendment); Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975) (finding live drama receives First
Amendment protection); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (holding right to wear armbands to protest Vietnam War
protected by First Amendment); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 14142 (1966)
(stating peaceful demonstration is protected by First Amendment).
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a Board of Education resolution which required all
students to participate in the flag salute. 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943). The Court
found that the flag salute was a symbolic way to communicate ideas, and therefore
protected by the First Amendment. See id. The court stated that "[w]e think the
action of local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends con-
stitutional limitations on their power and invade the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment of our Constitution to reserve from
all official control." Id. at 642.
36. See Katherine F. Rowe, Visual Art and the First Amendment; Moral Rights; Re-
sale Royalties, 312 PLI/Pat 307 (1991). Rowe notes that conduct is not protected by
the First Amendment unless it is expressive. See id. See also Al-Amin v. New York,
979 F. Supp. 168 (holding General Vendors Law constitutional as applied to sale of
perfume oil and incense sticks by Muslims because sale lacks inherently communi-
[Vol. 5: p. 103
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As it is a difficult task to determine which communications will
receive First Amendment protections, courts have developed vari-
ous criteria for different situations.37 For example, in Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson,38 the Supreme Court concluded that motion pictures
were protected by the First Amendment because they were a signifi-
cant medium for the communication of ideas.3 9 The Court noted
that each method of expression has its own peculiarities, and there-
fore its own rules. 40 Other courts have examined factors including
whether the conduct conveys political or social thought,41 whether
the normal observer would consider the conduct to be communica-
tive42 and whether the medium of communication may affect pub-
lic attitudes and behavior.43
Applying these tests, courts have held that visual art receives
First Amendment protection under certain circumstances. 44 In
cative element). Moreover, even protected speech may be limited by time, place
and manner restrictions. See Rowe, supra.
37. See, e.g., Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980) (examining
whether tatooing is First Amendment speech). The court declined to decide
whether or not a tatoo itself is art or speech, because the plaintiff stated he had no
interest in displaying finished tatoo images. See id. at 1254. Rather, the court deter-
mined that tatooing was not protected by the First Amendment for several reasons.
See id. First, there was no showing that political or social thought was conveyed by
the tatoos. See id. at 1254-44. Second, a normal observer would not regard the
injection of dyes as communication. See id. Third, tatooing could not take place in
a public forum due to the sterile conditions required. See id. Finally, tatooing was
not a significant medium for the communication of ideas. See id.
38. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
39. See id. at 501. See also Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d
146 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding First Amendment applies where activity is intertwined
with particularized message).
40. See Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503. The Court stated that "[T] he basic principles
of freedom of speech and of the press, like the First Amendment's command, do
not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court,
make freedom of expression the rule." Id.
41. See Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970) (finding artist had only
minimal constitutional interest in displaying non-political art in university hall-
way). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Close, see infra notes 45-47 and
accompanying text.
42. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408-10 (1974) (finding student's
act of hanging U.S. flag upside down from window with peace symbol made of
removable black tape was conduct "sufficiently imbued with elements of communi-
cation" to fall within First Amendment).
43. SeeJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (holding mo-
tion pictures are organ of public opinion and therefore safeguarded by First
Amendment).
44. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court noted
that "in the area of freedom of speech and press the courts must always remain
sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political or sci-
entific expression." Id. at 22-23. Despite the importance of art as a form of expres-
sion, visual art which has political content has generally received more protection
than non-political art. Compare Serra v. United States Gen. Serv. Admin., 847 F.2d
1998]
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Close v. Ledere,45 the First Circuit rejected the proposition that art
receives as much constitutional protection as political or social
speech.46 Rather, the Close court pointed out that there are varying
degrees of speech which should receive different levels of protec-
tion, depending on the subject matter.47 In a prominent decision,
the California Court of Appeals adopted this view in San Francisco
Street Artists Guild v. Scott,4 8 holding that sales of paintings, sculp-
tures and beadwork did not reach the high level of expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 49 In Piarowski v. Illinois Community
College District 515,50 the Seventh Circuit endorsed a broad interpre-
tation of the First Amendment's protection of visual art, finding
that the First Amendment protects purely artistic expression as well
1045 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding government did not violate artist's First Amendment
rights by relocating non-political sculpture) and Piarowski v. Illinois Community
College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding college did not abridge
faculty member's First Amendment rights when it ordered him to display his non-
political art in another room) with Sefick v. Chicago, 485 F. Supp. 644, 648 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) (holding city violated artist's First Amendment rights when it revoked
permission to display statue which satirized mayor).
45. 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970). In Close, the plaintiff, an art instructor at the
University of Massachusetts, displayed some controversial paintings on the walls of
a corridor in the Student Union. See id. at 989. The paintings included nudes
displaying genitalia in "clinical detail," and paintings with tiles such as "I'm only
12 and already my mother's lover wants me," and "I am the only virgin in my
school." Id. at 990.
46. See id. at 989-90.
47. See id. at 990. The court stated "[clases dealing with students' rights to
hear possibly unpopular speakers involve a medium and subject matter entitled to
greater protection than plaintiffs art. Even as to verbal communication the extent
of the protection may depend upon the subject matter." Id. at 990. (citing New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964)). The court reconciled its holding with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), by stating that the Burstyn court recognized
that there are degrees of speech. See Close, 424 F.2d at 990.
48. 37 Cal. App. 3d 667 (App. Ct. 1974). The plaintiffs in San Francisco Street
Artists Guild wished to sell paintings and sculptures of tiny plants, dolls which rep-
resented public figures, paintings and sculptures, crocheted clothing, macrames
made of beads, jewels and feathers, and similar objects. See id. at 669. The individ-
ual artists challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance prohibiting them from
selling their wares on public streets without a license. See id.
49. The court recognized that the symbolic expression of political, economic,
religious or social tenets was protected by the First Amendment and therefore sub-
ject to only limited control. See id. at 671 (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969); People v. Duffy, 179 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 875 (1947)).
50. 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985). Piarowski, the chairman of the art depart-
ment at Prairie State College, displayed several controversial stained glass windows
at a college art show. See id. at 627. The college requested that Piarowski remove
the displays from the open mall area, offering an alternative area for display on the
fourth floor. See id. at 628.
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as political expression.5 1 Although artistic expression receives First
Amendment protection, the amount of protection may be
limited. 52
Other factors may affect the amount of First Amendment pro-
tection accorded to visual expression. For example, in Serra v.
United States General Services Administration,53 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that First Amendment pro-
tection of art is limited where the artistic expression belongs to the
government. 54 In dicta, the court noted that even if Serra main-
tained First Amendment interests in his sculpture, the removal of
the sculpture from Federal Plaza was constitutional for several rea-
sons.5 5 First, removal of the sculpture was a permissible time, place
and manner restriction. 5 6 Second, relocation of the sculpture did
51. See id. The Piarowski court distinguished Close, noting that the issue in
Piarowski was relocation, rather than removal of the art. Additionally, the Piarowski
court noted that unlike the corridor at issue in Close, the college mall in Piarowski
was not frequented by children. See id. However, the Close court specifically noted
that their holding did not rest on the presence of children. See Close, 424 F.2d 989,
990 n.2.
52. For a discussion of the limits on the First Amendment's reach, see supra
note 36 and accompanying text.
53. 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988).
54. See id. (holding "artwork, like other non-verbal forms of expression, may
under some circumstances constitute speech for First Amendment pur-
poses") (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (topless dancing);
Piarowski v. Illinois Community College, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985) (art)).
In Sera, an artist brought an action to bar the United States General Services Ad-
ministration from removing his sculpture from Federal Plaza. See Sera, 847 F.2d at
1046. The General Services Administration commissioned Serra to create the
sculpture in 1979. See id at 1046-47. The sculpture, entitled "Tilted Arc," is an arc
of steel 120 feet long, 12 feet tall, and several inches thick. See id at 1047. The
sculpture was designed specifically for Federal Plaza. See id. Soon after the sculp-
ture was completed, the General Services Administration began to receive com-
plaints from community residents and federal employees, who felt that the
sculpture took up previously open space. See id. In addition, the sculpture's steel
began to oxidize, creating what the artist calls "a golden amber patina" and what
the sculpture's critics call "rust." Id. The artist claimed that his sculpture was "site-
specific" and that to move the sculpture would destroy it. See id. He argued that
the General Services Administration's decision to remove the sculpture violated his
rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 1048.
55. See id. at 1049-51.
56. See id. at 1049. Time, place and manner restrictions are valid "provided
that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the infor-
mation." Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984)). See also Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-05 (1984) (holding ordinance which prohibited posting
signs on public property was reasonable time, place and manner restriction). The
Serra court noted that time, place and manner restrictions are valid even in public
forums. Serra, 847 F.2d at 1049 n.1 (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 293). For further
1998]
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not preclude Serra from communicating his ideas in other ways. 57
Finally, the removal of the sculpture was not content-based. 58
B. First Amendment Analysis and Scrutiny
1. Forum Analysis
The first step in determining whether a government-imposed
speech restriction is constitutional is to determine the forum in
which the speech occurs. 59 There are three general categories of
forums: traditional public forums, 60 limited public forums61 and
nonpublic forums.62
Historically, the government's power to restrict speech is weak-
est when the speech occurs in a traditional public forum.63 Even in
discussion of the constitutionality of time, place and manner restrictions, see infra
notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
57. See Serra, 847 F.2d at 1050. The court noted that Serra had already had
six years to convey his message through the sculpture's presence in the Plaza. See
id. "[T]he First Amendment protects the freedom to express one's views, not the
freedom to continue speaking forever. . . ." Id.
58. See id. The General Services Administration's main reasons for removing
the sculpture were interference with the public's use of Federal Plaza and concern
for public safety and graffiti. See id. However, in similar cases where the decision
to remove art was content based, courts have found that the removal violated the
artist's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F. Supp. 644
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (holding removal of sculpture which satirized mayor's snow re-
moval efforts violated artist's constitutional rights because decision to remove was
content-based).
59. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985) (stating that extent to which government can limit speech depends on na-
ture of forum); Etheridge v. Hail, 56 F.3d 1324, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 1995) (same).
60. Traditional public fora are those places which, by long tradition or gov-
ernment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). Streets and sidewalks are
clear examples of traditional public forums. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939). In Hague, the court wrote:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and pub-
lic places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immuni-
ties, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Id.
61. Limited public forums are areas which have been created by the govern-
ment specifically to provide an area in which expressive activity can take place. See
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (hold-
ing school's internal mail system is limited public forum).
62. Nonpublic forums are areas which are not traditionally public forums that
the government has not opened for public use. See id. In a non-public forum, the
government can impose reasonable, viewpoint-neutral, content-based restrictions.
See Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 1989).
63. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46
(stating that in public forums, government cannot prohibit all communicative ac-
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public forums, however, the government can impose content-neu-
tral time, place and manner restrictions on protected speech. 64
These restrictions are permissible as long as the regulation is con-
tent-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest and leaves open ample alternative channels for communi-
cation.65  Additionally, the government can impose content-based
exclusions if the regulation can survive strict scrutiny.66
2. Content-Neutral v. Content-Based Restrictions
The second step in determining whether a restriction on
speech violates the First Amendment is to determine whether the
restriction is content-based or content-neutral. 67 Generally, con-
tent-based restrictions are restrictions on communication based
upon the message conveyed. 6s In contrast, content-neutral restric-
tions are restrictions that limit expression without regard to the
message of the communication. 69
tivity); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (holding government's
ability to restrict expression in public forums is very limited).
64. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984). In time, place and manner cases, the test for determining whether a re-
striction is content-neutral is whether the government has adopted a regulation to
accomplish an independent goal which indirectly causes the restriction or suppres-
sion of speech. See Barbara Hoffman, Law for Art's Sake in the Public Realm, 16
COLUM-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 39, 79 (Fall 1991).
65. See id. at 45-46.
66. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46. In order to meet strict scrutiny, the
government must show that the regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest, and that the regulation is narrowly tailored. See id. at 46.
67. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHL L.
REv. 46 (1987).
68. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). In Turner,
the Supreme Court wrote:
Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that
requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the govern-
ment, contravenes th[e] essential right [of each person to decide for him-
self which ideas and beliefs deserve expression, consideration, and
adherence]. Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government
seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpop-
ular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coer-
cion rather than persuasion.
Id. at 641. See also Stone, supra note 67. Stone gives several examples of content
based restrictions, such as laws that prohibit seditious libel, ban the publication of
confidential information, forbid the hiring of teachers who advocate violent over-
throw of the government, or outlaw the display of the swastika in certain neighbor-
hoods. See id at 47.
69. See Stone, supra note 67. Examples of content neutral restrictions include
laws that restrict noisy speeches near a hospital, ban billboards in residential com-
munities, limit campaign contributions, or prohibit the mutilation of draft cards.
See id at 48. Stone notes that a hypothetical law which stated "[ [n] o person may
make any speech; distribute any leaflet; publish any newspaper, magazine, or peri-
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In Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC,70 the Supreme Court
developed guidelines for courts to use to determine whether a reg-
ulation is content-based or content-neutral.71 First, courts may ex-
amine whether a particular regulation of speech exists because of
agreement or disagreement with the message it conveys.72 Gener-
ally, laws that distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech
based on ideas or views expressed are content-based; laws that con-
fer benefits or impose burdens on speech regardless of the ideas or
views expressed are content-neutral. 73
The court's determination of whether a speech restriction is
content-based or content-neutral will determine what level of scru-
tiny the court should apply.74 When speech occurs in a public fo-
rum, and the regulation is content-based, the court will apply strict
scrutiny, and the regulation will be struck down unless it is neces-
sary to achieve a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.75 In contrast, content-neutral regulations are
subjected to a much lower standard of review and may be upheld
for various reasons.76 As a result, the court's determination of
odical; operate any radio, television, or cable system; or engage in any other form
of public communication" would be content-neutral. See id at 58.
70. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
71. See id. at 642-43 (1994).
72. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The Ward
Court stated that:
The government's purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation
that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed
neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages
but not others. Government regulation of expressive activity is content
neutral so long as it is justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.'
Id. (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 47-8 (1986); Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
73. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
74. See Stone, supra note 67 at 54.
75. See id. at 53. Stone notes that strict scrutiny almost invariably results in
invalidation of the challenged restriction. See id.
76. See id. at 48-49. Stone indicates that the Court has articulated the follow-
ing standards of review as applying to content-neutral regulations:
1. Some content-neutral restrictions do not even 'implicate' first amend-
ment concerns.
2. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they are
'reasonable.'
3. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if 'they are
designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unrea-
sonably limit alternative avenues of communication.'
4. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they are within
'the constitutional power of the Government,' they further 'an important
or substantial governmental interest,' the governmental interest is 'unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression,' and the restriction is 'no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.'
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whether the restriction is content-neutral or content-based can
often be outcome-determinative. To evaluate the constitutionality
of content-based restrictions, a court must determine the position
of the speech in the scale of First Amendment values. 77 If the court
finds that the restricted speech occupies a subordinate position, the
court engages in categorical balancing.78 Alternatively, if the
speech does not occupy a subordinate position, the speech receives
nearly absolute protection. 79
The Supreme Court has provided a framework for analysis for
courts examining the constitutionality of a content-neutral regula-
tion. In United States v. O'Brien,80 the Court articulated the applica-
ble constitutional test for regulation of expressive conduct, stating:
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental inter-
est; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
5. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional depending on the
Court's resolution of 'the delicate and difficult task' of weighing 'the cir-
cumstances' and appraising 'the substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation.'
6. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they serve 'suffi-
ciently strong, subordinating' interests by means of 'narrowly drawn regu-
lations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering
with First Amendment freedoms.'
7. Some content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if they are 'necessi-
tated by a compelling governmental interest' and are 'narrowly tailored
to serve that interest.'
Id. (citations omitted).
77. See Stone, supra note 67 at 47-8.
78. Through categorical balancing, the court considers the relative value of
the speech, and the risk of limiting high value expression through the restriction.
See id. at 118 n.4. Examples of low value speech include obscenity, express incite-
ment, commercial advertising, fighting words, and child pornography. See id. at
118 n.2. For a discussion of low value speech, see Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and
the First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589 (1986).
79. See Stone, supra note 67 at 48. Stone notes that, outside of low-value
speech, the Court has invalidated almost every content based restriction it has con-
sidered in thirty years. See id. at 48.
80. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien and three companions burned their Selec-
tive Service registration certificates on the steps of a courthouse in Boston. See id.
at 369. O'Brien was convicted of violating 50 U.S.C. 462(b) which states that a
person is in violation of the statute if he "forges, alters, knowingly destroys, know-
ingly mutilates, or in any manner changes such certificate . . . ." Id. at 370.
O'Brien argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the First
Amendment. See id.
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greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.81
The Supreme Court applied the O'Brien test in Members of City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent.82 In Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, the Court addressed the constitutionality of an ordinance
which prohibited the posting of signs on public property. s3 The
central issue in Taxpayers for Vincent was whether the city's interest
in eliminating visual blight was sufficiently substantial to justify the
effect of the ordinance on appellees' expression, and whether the
effect of the ordinance was no greater than necessary to accomplish
the City's purpose.84 The Court found that the city's interest in
keeping the city clean and preventing unsightliness was sufficiently
substantial.8 5 Additionally, the Court found that the regulation was
narrowly tailored.8 6 The Court distinguished Taxpayers for Vincent
81. Id. at 376. In Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, he states, however:
I wish to make explicit my understanding that this passage does not fore-
close consideration of First Amendment claims in those rare instances
when an 'incidental' restriction upon expression, imposed by a regula-
tion which furthers an 'important or substantial' governmental interest
and satisfies the Court's other criteria, in practice has the effect of en-
tirely preventing a 'speaker' from reaching a significant audience with
whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate.
Id. at 388-89.
82. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). In Taxpayers for Vincent, a group of supporters for a
political candidate posted signs on utility poles throughout the city. See id. at 792.
Pursuant to a municipal code which prohibited posting signs on utility poles, city
employees removed all the posters. See id. at 793. The taxpayers filed an action
seeking an injunction preventing enforcement of the ordinance. See id. The Dis-
trict Court found that "[t]he Los Angeles Planning and Zoning Code was enacted
... to conserve and stabilize the value of property; to provide adequate open
spaces for light and air;.., to facilitate adequate provisions for community utilities
and facilities and to promote health, safety, and the general welfare." Id. at 794
n.6.
83. See id. at 792-93.
84. See id. at 805.
85. See id. at 805-07. The Court concluded that "municipalities have a
weighty, essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant for-
mats for expression." Id. at 806. See also Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490 (1981) (holding city's interest in avoiding visual clutter sufficient to justify
prohibition of billboards); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71
(1976) ("[T]he city's interest in attempting to preserve [or improve] the quality of
urban life is one that must be accorded high respect . . . ."); Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (holding city entitled to protect unwilling
viewers against intrusive advertising by prohibiting political advertising on buses);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (rejecting notion city is powerless to protect
citizens from unwanted exposure to certain methods of expression which may le-
gitimately be deemed public nuisance).
86. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10 (1984) (holding that city's
ban on signs burdened no more speech than necessary to eliminate visual clutter).
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from Schneider v. New Jersey,87 in which the court held that ordi-
nances which prohibited canvassing and distribution of handbills in
public streets violated the First Amendment.88 The distinction
rested on the fact that in Taxpayers for Vincent, it was the posted signs
themselves which created the visual blight the city was trying to
eliminate. 89 In contrast, in Schneider, an anti-littering statute would
have allowed the expression but prohibited the visual blight.90
3. Time, Place and Manner Restrictions
The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to
allow the government to restrict the time, place and manner of
public forum speech.91 For example, in Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence,92 the Court held that the National Park Service
could refuse to allow demonstrators to sleep in tents on the Mall in
Washington to protest the plight of the homeless, without violating
the demonstrators' First Amendment rights. 9 3 Subsequently, in
87. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). In Schneider, five individuals appealed their convic-
tions for violating city ordinances which prohibited canvassing and distribution of
handbills. See id.
88. See id. at 165. In its analysis, the Court stated that:
Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep
their communities' streets open and available for movement of people
and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated. So
long as legislation to this end does not abridge the constitutional liberty
of one rightfully upon the street to impart information through speech
or the distribution of literature, it may lawfully regulate the conduct of
those using the streets.
Id. at 160.
89. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 809. The Court stated that:
[t] he right recognized in Schneider is to tender the written material to the
passerby who may accept or reject it, and who may thereafter keep it,
dispose of it properly, or incur the risk of punishment if he lets it fall to
the ground.... With respect to the signs [in Taxpayers for Vincent], how-
ever, it is the tangible medium of expression that has the adverse impact
on the appearance of the landscape.
Id.
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (holding New
York City's decision to deny permit to hold concert to Rock Against Racism, based
on previous problems with noise and crowd control at Rock Against Racism con-
cert was permissible time, place and manner restriction); Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (holding National Park Service's deci-
sion not to allow demonstrators to sleep in tents to protest plight of homeless was
permissible time, place and manner restriction).
92. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). In Clark, the National Park Service issued a permit
to Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) to conduct a demonstration at
Lafayette Park and the Mall, which are national parks in Washington, D.C.. See id.
at 8. The Park Service denied CCNV's request that demonstrators be allowed to
sleep in tents to demonstrate the plight of the homeless. See id.
93. See id.
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Ward v. Rock Against Racism,94 the Court articulated the relevant test
for time, place and manner restrictions. Under Ward, the govern-
ment can impose reasonable content-neutral restrictions on the
time, place or manner of protected speech, as long as the restric-
tions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental inter-
est and leave ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.9 5
C. Prior Judicial Treatment of the General Vendors Law
In 1988, the New York City Criminal Court examined the New
York General Vendors Law in People v. Milby.96 In Milby, the de-
fendant artist argued that written material and pictorial artwork
should be treated identically in the requirements for a vendor's li-
cense.9 7 In its analysis, the Millry court found that pictorial artwork
94. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). In Ward, Rock Against Racism sought an event per-
mit to hold its concert at the Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell in New York City. See
id. at 784-85. The city denied the permit, based on problems with noise and crowd
control at previous Rock Against Racism concerts. See id. Rock Against Racism
sought an injunction. See id. The Supreme Court upheld the noise regulations.
See id.
95. See id. at 790. See also Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Tax-
payers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-15 (1984) (upholding ordinance prohibiting
posting of signs on public property as valid time, place and manner restriction).
The Ward Court stressed that a regulation need not be the least intrusive
means of serving the government's interests, but "this standard does not mean that
a time, place, or manner regulation may burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the government's legitimate interests." Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-
99. The Ward Court held that while the means chosen may not be substantially
broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, the regulation will
not be invalid merely because less-restrictive alternatives exist. See id. at 800.
Courts have applied these tests to various situations. For example, in Martin v.
City of Struthers, the Supreme Court held that an ordinance which prohibited
knocking on doors and ringing doorbells to distribute handbills or circulars vio-
lated the First Amendment. See Martin, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). In Martin, an individ-
ual was convicted of violating a city ordinance which prohibited knocking on doors
and ringing doorbells to distribute leaflets or circulars. See id. at 142. Similarly, in
Graft v. Chicago, the appellate court held that a city ordinance which required
licenses for a sidewalk newsstand did not violate the First Amendment or the equal
protection clause. See Graft, 9 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993). Richard Graff, a news-
stand operator, brought an action challenging an ordinance which required him
to obtain a permit. See id. at 1311. He argued that the ordinance violated the First
Amendment as an unlawful restriction on free speech, and that it violated the
equal protection clause because other non-expressive uses of the public streets (for
example, sidewalk cafes) were treated differently under the ordinance. See id. at
1311-12.
96. 140 Misc. 2d 476, 477 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1988). In Milbry, the defendant
received a ticket for vending his paintings without a license. See id. at 476. The
General Vendors Law is the same statute that is at issue in Bery. See Bery v. New
York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2408 (1997).
97. See Millby, 140 Misc. 2d at 477.
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was covered by the First Amendment. 98 The court upheld the law
as constitutional, rejecting the argument that art should be treated
in the same way as printed matter for First Amendment purposes. 99
Despite the First Amendment, the court noted that a municipality
can still regulate expression under certain conditions.10 0 There-
fore, the court held the vending of artwork was receiving all the
First Amendment protection to which it was entitled.10 1 Addition-
ally, the Milbiy court pointed out that a distinction violates the
Equal Protection Clause when it is based on content, not medium
of expression. 10 2
IV. NARRATiVE ANALYSIS
In Bery, the Second Circuit analyzed three issues:10 3 (1) Was
the plaintiffs' artwork entitled to First Amendment protection;
10 4
(2) if so, did the ordinance violate plaintiffs' First Amendment
98. See id. at 479.
99. See id.
100. See id. The court stated:
The phrase "First Amendment," however, is not equivalent to "open ses-
ame." It has been consistently held that a municipal corporation has the
right to regulate and license the use of public forums, even with respect
to First Amendment activities, as long as the regulation relates reasonably
to time, place, and manner, does not cut off other channels of communi-
cation, is content-neutral and does not vest in administrative officials the
discretion to grant or deny a permit. They must serve a legitimate gov-
ernmental function and be narrowly drawn.
Id. (citing Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Consolidated
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Hynes v.
Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Erzonzik v. City of Jackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
101. See id. at 479-80.
102. See Miltby, 140 Misc. 2d at 480 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)).
103. See id. In its analysis, the Second Circuit reviewed the denial of the pre-
liminary injunction motions using an abuse of discretion standard. See Bery, 97
F.3d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2408 (1997). However, since the
appellants were seeking vindication of First Amendment rights, the court reviewed
the fact findings of the district court de novo. See id. The plaintiff brought the
case on a motion for preliminary injunction. See id. Therefore, the plaintiffs were
required to demonstrate that they were likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of the requested relief. See id. (citing Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. Israel, 670
F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1982). Violations of First Amendment rights are commonly
considered irreparable injuries for purposes of a preliminary injunction. See id.
(citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (stating "[ t ] he loss of First Amend-
ment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes ir-
reparable injury")).
104. See id. at 694-96. For a discussion of the court's analysis of this issue, see
infra notes 34-58 and accompanying text.
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rights; 10 5 and (3) did the ordinance violate the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?10 6
A. First Amendment Protection of Artwork
The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' artwork was enti-
fled to First Amendment protection. 10 7 According to the court,
First Amendment protections are not limited to political speech,
and thus the appellate court rejected the district court's view that
the First Amendment's primary function was to protect political
and religious views.' 08 Rather, First Amendment protections ex-
tend to various forms of entertainment' 0 9 as well as political dem-
onstrations." 0 While the First Amendment is necessary for the
preservation of political democracy, the court noted that the pur-
pose of the First Amendment is to protect all manifestations of
peaceful expression."'
Applying these concepts to the facts, the appellate court found
that both the district court and New York City had an overly restric-
105. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 696-98. For a discussion of the court's analysis of this
issue, see infra notes 59-95 and accompanying text.
106. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 699. For a discussion of the court's analysis of this
issue, see infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
107. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 694-96.
108. See id.
109. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (holding First
Amendment protects music); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546 (1975) (holding First Amendment protects theater); Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952) (holding First Amendment protects film); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (holding First Amendment protects entertainment).
110. See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (concerning peaceful
marches); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (concerning peace-
ful marches); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
505 (1969) (wearing black arm bands to evidence disapproval of involvement in
Vietnam); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (relating to sit-ins by blacks to
protest racial discrimination); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (concerning refusal to salute American flag).
111. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 694. Past cases have held that peaceful expression of
non-political ideas are protected by the First Amendment. The Bery court cited
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which stated that while a central purpose of the
First Amendment was to protect free discussion of governmental affairs, "our cases
have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, eco-
nomic, literary or ethical matters... is not entitled to full First Amendment pro-
tection." Abood, 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1976). See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 714 (1977) (stating First Amendment "secures the right to proselytize reli-
gious, political, and ideological causes"); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427
U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding protection of the First Amendment
is fully applicable to communication of social, political, and philosophical
messages); Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959) (uphold-
ing suppression of motion picture because it expresses idea that under certain
circumstances adultery may be proper behavior strikes at heart of First Amend-
ment protection).
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tive view of the First Amendment.1 1 2 Rejecting the district court's
view that "art is farther from the core [of the First Amendment]
than written word,"1 13 the appellate court found that ideas por-
trayed by visual art are protected by the First Amendment. 14
In its holding, the court rejected New York City's argument
that the sale of art should receive less protection than the art it-
self.115 The City argued that in order to receive constitutional pro-
tection, the sale of protected material must be "inseparably
intertwined with a 'particularized message.'"116 Consequently, the
City argued that while the appellants were free to display their art-
work without a license, they could not sell it.117 Rejecting these
arguments, the Second Circuit held that First Amendment protec-
tions extend to the sale of protected materials.1 1 8 Finally, the Sec-
ond Circuit disagreed with the district court's view that visual art,
such as painting, photographs, prints and sculptures, should be
treated the same way as crafts such as jewelry, pottery and silver
making." 9 In the Second Circuit's view, art, as opposed to crafts,
always attempts to convey a message to its viewer, and therefore,
should receive First Amendment protection.'2 0
112. See Bevy, 97 F.3d at 695. The court stated that the myopic vision of the
District Court "not only overlooks case law central to the First Amendment juris-
prudence but fundamentally misperceives the essence of visual communication
and artistic expression." Id. Stressing that visual art is more than "mere merchan-
dise," the court held that visual art is entitled to full First Amendment protection.
Id. For a discussion of the District Court's analysis in Bery, see supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text.
113. Bery v. New York, 906 F. Supp. 163, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
114. See Bery, 97 F.3d 689, 695. The appellate court stated:
Visual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emo-
tions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly
entitled to full First Amendment protection.... The ideas and concepts
embodied in visual art have the power to transcend... language limita-
tions and reach beyond a particular language to both the educated and
the illiterate.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
115. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 695.
116. Id. (citing Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146 (2d
Cir. 1990).
117. See id.
118. See id. See also Riley v. National Fed'n of Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 801
(1988) (stating "[ilt is well settled that a speaker's rights are not lost merely be-
cause compensation is received; a speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is
paid to speak"). Additionally, the Beiy court noted that selling art on the streets is
a part of the message of the art. Bery, 97 F.3d at 696. The plaintiff artists believe
that art should be available to everyone, not just the wealthy. See id. Additionally,
selling art on the streets showed that these artists were part of the "real world." Id.
119. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 695.
120. See id. The court stated that:
1998]
19
Mathes: Bery v. New York: Do Artists Have a First Amendment Right to Sell
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
122 VILLANovA SPORTS & ENr. LAW JOURNAL
B. First Amendment Analysis of the Constitutionality of the
General Vendors Law
Once it determined that the First Amendment applied to the
case, the appellate court addressed whether the ordinance violated
the artists' First Amendment rights.1 21 The court declined to de-
cide whether the restriction was content-based or content-neutral,
declaring that since the ordinance would fail under either test, it
would merely apply the less stringent content-neutral test. 122
Under the content-neutral test, a regulation may restrict the
time, place and manner of protected speech if the regulation is
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest" and
"leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication."1 2 3
Applying the test, the Bery court found that the city had a significant
interest in keeping its public places safe and free of congestion. 124
The regulation, however, was not narrowly tailored enough to pass
the test.' 25 According to the court, the ordinance created a de
While these objects may at times have expressive content, paintings, photo-
graphs, prints and sculptures such as those appellants seek to display and sell in
public areas of the City, always communicate some idea or concept to those who
view it, and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection.
Id. (emphasis added).
121. See id.
122. See id. at 696. For a discussion of the constitutional analysis of content-
neutral and content-based regulations, see supra notes 67-79 and accompanying
text.
123. Bery, 97 F.3d at 696 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
124. See id. at 696-97. However, the court noted that there was nothing on the
record to show that New York needed to ensure street safety and lack of conges-
tion. See id. See also Wright v. Chief of Transit Police, 558 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir.
1977) (city must find less restrictive alternatives than complete ban on newspaper
vending in subways); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704-05 (2d
Cir. 1993) (street begging is expressive conduct which cannot be totally barred
without unconstitutional interference with First Amendment rights).
125. See Bey, 97 F.3d at 697. The court noted that the failure of the district
court to analyze narrow tailoring and alternative channels was an abuse of discre-
tion. See id. at 697. In its analysis, the court noted that the ordinance is a de facto
bar which prevents visual artists from selling their art in public places in New York
City. See id. The court stated that the City may pass and enforce narrowly designed
restrictions as to where artists may exhibit their art in order to keep the streets free
of congestion, but the City may not ban an entire category of expression. See id.
However, the court noted that the display of large, cumbersome works that would
block public traverse on the streets could be subjected to discrete regulation as to
time, place and location. See id. Additionally, both visual and written expression
could be restricted by regulations addressed to particular areas of the City where
public congestion might create physical hazards and public chaos. See id. See also
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (requiring license for parade is
valid exercise of state public power to control time, place and manner of public
access to public spaces); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S.
750, 760 (1988) (requiring vending machine license is valid exercise of state public
power to control time, place and manner of public access to public spaces); Gan-
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facto bar which prevented visual artists from exhibiting and selling
their art in public areas. 126 The court held that the city could not
ban an entire category of expression when more narrowly drawn
regulations would suffice to accomplish the city's legitimate interest
in keeping the streets and sidewalks free of congestion. 127
Additionally, the court found that no alternative channels of
communication were available to the artists.128 According to the
court, the public display and sale of art is a different form of expres-
sion than displaying art in museums or galleries. 129 Therefore, ap-
pellants were entitled to a public forum for their expressive
activities.' 30
C. Analysis of the General Vendors Law Under the Equal
Protection Clause
Finally, the Bery court held that the ordinance violated the
Equal Protection Clause.' 3 ' According to the court, the ban on the
sale of unlicensed art violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in light of the fact that persons who
nett Satellite Info. Network v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir.
1984) (restricting right to distribute newspapers through newsracks on public prop-
erty is valid exercise of state police power to control time, place and manner of
public access to public spaces).
126. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 697. The court found that the cap on the total
number of licenses made it all but impossible for the appellants to secure a license.
See id. Richard Shrader, the former Commissioner of the New York City's Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs, stated that in his extensive experience, he never
learned of an artist being licensed to sell art work. See id. at 697 n.7.
127. See id. at 697.
128. See id. at 698. The court recognized that artists could sell their artwork
from their homes or in other private places, but found that they are entitled to a
public forum for their activities. See id. at 698 (citing Southeastern Promotions
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975)).
129. See id. The court pointed out that art displayed on the street reaches
people who might not choose to enter a gallery or museum. See id. The court
wrote, "[a]ppellants are interested in attracting and communicating with the man
or woman on the street who may never have been to a gallery and indeed who
might never have thought before of possessing a piece of art until induced to do so
on seeing appellant's work." Id. Additionally, the court noted that not all artists
may be interested in or able to display their works in a gallery. See id.
130. See id.
131. See Bey, 97 F.3d at 699. The court stated that because the ordinance
impinges on a fundamental right, the trial court erred in dismissing the artists'
argument under a rational basis test. See id. For a discussion of the trial court's
decision, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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wished to sell written material were not required to have a
license.13 2
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Bery court's holding that the General Vendors Law vio-
lated the First Amendment was based on its findings that (1) the
visual expression at issue should receive as much First Amendment
protection as written expression, and (2) the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored. 133 In reaching these unprecedented conclu-
sions, the Second Circuit relied on expansive interpretations of ex-
isting law. First, in determining that visual and written expression
should receive the same amount of First Amendment protection,
the Second Circuit broadly interpreted the First Amendment to
provide more protection to art than it had previously received.1 34
Second, the Bery court failed to apply the Supreme Court's analysis
in Taxpayers for Vincent when examining whether the General Ven-
dors Law was narrowly tailored.135
A. First Amendment Protection of Visual Expression
In Bery, the Second Circuit criticized the district court's finding
that the artwork at issue was not entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection. 136 The Second Circuit took the position that visual art is
entitled to the same First Amendment protection as written
works.1 37 This assertion is unprecedented in the degree of First
Amendment protection it provides to art and visual images.1 38
132. See Beiy, 97 F.3d at 699. The Beiy court's equal protection decision will
not be discussed further in this Note, except as it relates to the First Amendment
holding.
133. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis in Bery, see supra notes
103-32 and accompanying text.
134. For a critical discussion of the law relied on by the Second Circuit, see
infra notes 136-53 and accompanying text.
135. For a discussion of the Bery court's analysis of the narrow tailoring of the
General Vendors Law, see supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
136. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 695. The appellate court stated that "Both the court
and the City demonstrate an unduly restricted view of the First Amendment and of
visual art itself. Such myopic vision not only overlooks case law central to First
Amendment jurisprudence, but fundamentally misperceives the essence of visual
communication and artistic expression." Id.
137. See id.
138. See, e.g. Piarowski v. Illinois Community College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625
(7th Cir. 1985) (stating "the freedom of speech and of the press protected by the
First Amendment has been interpreted to embrace purely artistic as well as polit-
ical expression ... unless the artistic expression is obscene"); Close v. Lederle, 424
F.2d 988 (lst Cir. 1970) (rejecting the proposition that art receives as much First
Amendment protection as political or social speech); Sefick v. Chicago, 485 F.
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In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit's reliance on
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette3 9 was misplaced.
Although the Barnette decision protects visually symbolic speech, it
is not clear that visual art rises to the same level of "symbolic
speech" protected in Barnette.140 Moreover, other courts have re-
jected the view that art should receive the level of First Amendment
protection which the Bery decision provides. 4 1 For example, in
Close v. Lederle,142 the First Circuit rejected the plaintiffs assertion
that art receives as much Constitutional protection as political or
social speech.1 43 Rather, the court found that there are varying de-
grees of First Amendment protection. t 44 Similarly, in San Francisco
Street Artists Guild v. Scott,14 5 the court found that sale of artifacts did
not rise to the same level of expression as parades or the wearing of
armbands. 146 The Bery court did not address this precedent in its
decision. 147 Rather, the court's holding was based on its findings
Supp. 644 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (holding First Amendment is meant to embrace purely
artistic expression); San Francisco Street Artists Guild v. Scott, 37 Cal. App. 3d 667
(App. Ct. 1974) (holding sale of artifacts does not reach same level of protected
expression as parades or wearing armbands); People v. Milbry, 140 Misc. 2d 476
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1988) (stating pictorial artwork is covered by First Amendment).
See also supra notes 37-58 and accompanying text.
139. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The court cited Barnette to support its proposition
that visual images are an effective method to communicate ideas. For a discussion
of Barnette, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
140. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632 (discussing symbols such as flags, uniforms,
crowns, altars, and salutes). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Barnette,
see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
141. See Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding art does not
receive same amount of First Amendment protection as political or social speech);
San Francisco Street Artists Guild v. Scott, 37 Cal. App. 3d 667 (App. Ct.
1974) (holding artifacts and crafts not entitled to same amount of First Amend-
ment protection as certain other forms of expression).
142. 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the facts and holding of
Close v. Lederle, see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
143. See Close, 424 F.2d at 989-90.
144. See id. at 990. The Close court stressed that art which is not seeking to
express political or social thought will not receive as much protection as more
political speech. See id.
145. 37 Cal. App. 3d 667 (App. Ct. 1974). For a discussion of the facts and
holding of San Francisco Street Artists Guild, see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying
text.
146. See San Francisco Street Artists Guild, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 671. The San Fran-
cisco Street Artists Guild court stated that "the sale of the described artifacts does not
reach this high level of expression, even though the items sold may have about
them something of the personality of their creators." Id.
147. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 694-96. It is important to note that most of these
cases, with the exception of Serra, were not binding on the Bery court. However, it
is the author's view that these cases are highly persuasive.
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that visual images are a powerful way to communicate ideas.148
However, the court did not provide a clear analysis of where First
Amendment protection ends. 149
The Beiy court declined to decide whether the regulation at
issue was content-neutral or content-based, stating that it was not
clear that the regulation was content-neutral. 150 This observation
was based on the fact that the ordinance distinguished between
written and visual expression.151 However, the court's distinction
rests on the assumption that written and visual expression receive
the same First Amendment protection. 152 If visual expression actu-
ally receives less protection than written expression, it is perfectly
logical that a content-neutral regulation might restrict visual ex-
pression, while leaving written expression unrestricted.' 53
B. Narrow Tailoring of the General Vendors Law
The court's holding that the ordinance violated the First
Amendment was heavily based on its finding that the ordinance was
not narrowly tailored154 and that alternative channels of communi-
cation did not exist.155 Applying the standards enunciated in Tax-
payers for Vincent,' 56 the court found that although the city had a
significant interest in maintaining cleanliness, the ordinance was
not narrowly tailored.15 7 In its analysis, the court relied on its find-
148. See id. at 695. The court pointed out that visual images are often used in
Third World countries so that those who are unable to read can recognize the
party or candidate they wish to vote for. See id. Additionally, the court referred to
Homer Winslow's paintings on the Civil War as an example of pictorial expression.
See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 697. For a discussion of content-neutral and content-based reg-
ulations, see supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
151. See Bey, 97 F.3d at 696. The Bery court noted that "an entire medium of
expression is being lost." Id. at 697.
152. For a discussion of the Bery court's analysis of this issue, see supra notes
112-14 and accompanying text.
153. See Milbry, 140 Misc. 2d at 480. The Milbry court noted that this may lead
to a paradoxical outcome, because political artwork must be licensed and non-
political written matter need not be. See id. Despite this, however, the Milbry court
still found the regulation constitutional. See id.
154. For a discussion of the Beiy court's analysis of the narrow tailoring issue,
see supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. The court's finding on narrow
tailoring was largely based on the fact that licenses were nearly impossible to ob-
tain. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 697.
155. For a discussion of the Bery court's analysis of the alternative channels of
communication issue, see supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Taxpayers for Vincent, see supra
notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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ing that the licensing cap in Bery created a de facto bar to the sale of
art.158
Applying the reasoning of Taxpayers for Vincent to the facts of
Bery could lead to a different result. The court in Taxpayers for Vin-
cent addressed situations where the substantive evil is created by the
expression itself, finding that in these cases, a complete ban on the
expression would not violate the First Amendment. 159 New York
City's purpose in passing the General Vendors Law was to eliminate
the congestion caused by the presence of various vendors, includ-
ing art vendors, throughout the city. 160 In certain areas of the city,
such as Soho, many of the vendors on the streets and sidewalks
were art vendors.' 61 Therefore, in order to effectively reduce the
congestion, the city would have to decrease the number of vendors
present on the streets. Using the Taxpayers for Vincent analysis, one
could argue that an ordinance which banned or severely curtailed
the sale of art on the streets is narrowly tailored.
VI. IMPACT
In its analysis of Beyy, the Second Circuit granted unprece-
dented First Amendment protection to art and visual expression. 62
Although historically courts have accorded First Amendment pro-
tection to art in some circumstances, that protection has been lim-
ited and narrow.' 63 The Second Circuit's holding that art should
receive the same amount of First Amendment protection as written
materials is unprecedented in the amount of protection it provides
to art and visual expression. 164 This expansive view could have far-
reaching implications, possibly providing visual images with the
same amount of First Amendment protection received by political
and symbolic expression. 165 By providing art with this level of pro-
158. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 697.
159. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
808-09 (1984).
160. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 21.
162. For a critical discussion of the broad view applied in Bery, see supra notes
133-57 and accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of this issue, see supra notes 36-54 and accompanying
text.
164. See supra notes 37-58 and accompanying text.
165. For example, in a recent case, the district court held that a law which
banned sexually explicit materials in audio tapes, periodicals, and films, but not
sexually explicit material in books, violated both the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause. General Media Communications, Inc. v. Perry, 952 F.
Supp. 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Bery, 97 F.3d at 696, 699). The court also
pointed out that the law at issue in General Media distinguished between written
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tection, the court effectively limited cities' abilities to regulate the
public sale of art. 166
Although the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in Bery, it is
clear that the Bery decision creates controversy for courts attempt-
ing to determine how much protection the First Amendment ac-
cords to visual expression. 167 Undoubtedly, this decision will
influence future judicial interpretations of the First Amendment's
protection of visual expression.1 68 As a result, the potential effects
of the Second Circuit's decision in Bery will generate controversy
among the courts until the Supreme Court considers the issue.
Christina A. Mathes
and visual expression, and proscribed only visual expression. See id. For this rea-
son, the General Media court applied strict scrutiny and found that the law violated
the First Amendment. See id. Similarly, at least one commentator has cited Bery to
support the proposition that "art need not... express identifiable ideas in order to
receive First Amendment protection." See Mach, supra note 1 at 388 and n.22.
166. See BeTy, 97 F.3d at 698-99. Interestingly, artists in New York still face
restrictions on their ability to sell art in public places. In 1998, the City Depart-
ment of Parks and Recreation issued rules which required artists to get a license to
sell art on the Fifth Avenue sidewalk near the Metropolitan Musuem of Art. See
Somini Sengupta, Artists Arrested in Raucous Rally Against Sales Permits Near Musuem,
N.Y. TiMES, March 2, 1998, at BI. In defense of the new rules, Parks Department
officials stated that the Second Circuit's decision in Beiy did not apply to the Parks
Department property. See id. On March 1, 1998, the artists staged a protest, hold-
ing up pictures of Mayor Giuliani that likened him to a police state dictator and
singing "God Bless America." See id. During the protest, sixteen artists received
tickets for selling their art in front of the museum without permits. See id. Each
ticket carries a fine of up to $1000. See id. Additionally, four artists were arrested
as a result of the protest. See id.
167. See 117 S.Ct. 2408 (1997) (denying certiorari).
168. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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